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Curing the Cost Disease:
Legal Education, Legal Services,and
the Role of Income-Contingent Loans
John R. Brooks

I. Introduction
An odd feature of the debate about the role of legal education in the United
States is the simultaneous broad acceptance of the proposition that we have
too many law schools and too many law students,1 and also of the proposition
that our country has a severe problem with access to justice.2 The conventional
wisdom that there are not enough jobs for law school graduates is in tension
with the fact that likely millions of citizens interact with the legal system—with
both state and private parties—without adequate counsel and representation.
Law schools are closing even as many individuals and families deal with some
of the most important legal aspects of their lives—such as immigration, family,
domestic violence, disability, veterans’ benefits, and housing issues—without a
good lawyer, or even any lawyer at all. Yes, many graduates of lower-ranked
law schools struggle to find legal jobs, but if they walked into family court and
asked who needs a lawyer, many hands would shoot up.
What explains this disconnect? There is an unstated qualifier when we say
that there are not enough law jobs. What we really mean is that there are not
enough law jobs that could pay enough to make the investment in a law degree worthwhile.
Here, I mean investment in the broadest sense, including the opportunity of
cost of not choosing a different career and the sweat equity involved in three
years of study and passing the bar exam. But for purposes of this article, I also
John R. Brooks is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
1.

See, e.g., Steven J. Harper, Too Many Law Students, Too Few Jobs, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2015), https://
nyti.ms/1NyjHt5; Greg Toppo, Why You Might Want to Think Twice Before Going to Law School, USA
Today (June 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/06/28/law-schoolshunkering-down-enrollment-slips/430213001; Eric Posner, The Real Problem With Law Schools:
Too Many Lawyers, Slate (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
view_from_chicago/2013/04/the_real_problem_with_law_schools_too_many_lawyers.
html.

2.

Legal Svcs. Corp., The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of LowIncome Americans 6 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/justicegap2017 (finding that “86% of the
civil legal problems reported by low-income Americans in the past year received inadequate
or no legal help”).
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mean in it the narrow sense of the monetary cost of a legal education. There
are many steps our country would have to take to make justice more available
to more people, but one of them is to make legal education more affordable,
to encourage more people to study law and join the bar. Another is to make
legal services themselves more affordable, so more people would be willing to
get counsel when they need it.3
But making both legal education and legal services more affordable is, as
we have found, incredibly difficult. And this is not because of some broad
systemic failure in these industries, but rather because of natural, even positive,
economic forces. As labor-intensive services, both legal education and legal
services are subject to an economic phenomenon known as “Baumol’s cost
disease,” which explains why the prices of goods and services with no or slow
growth in labor productivity increase faster than inflation over time. The
“disease” moniker underscores that the rising prices are troubling for these
services, and also that they are caused by something deeper than, e.g., a
misallocation of resources. But as I explain in more detail in Part III below, the
causes of the cost disease are actually positive trends, namely economy-wide
growth in productivity and wages. Quite simply, if the wages for those who
work in legal education and legal services continue to rise, so will the prices of
those services (barring the creation of some industry-disrupting technology).
One person’s wage is another person’s price.4
However, the silver lining of the cost disease is that it has a cure. That is,
to the extent that price growth in legal education and legal services is driven
by increases in productivity elsewhere in the economy and in wages overall,
the economy as a whole can also afford the price increases in the goods and
services afflicted by the cost disease. But since the benefits of productivity and
wage growth are not evenly distributed—not by a long shot—managing the cost
3.

For purposes of narrative simplicity, this article will generally refer to the lack of legal services
in terms of direct representation in legal matters, such as cases in family or immigration court
or in administrative proceedings for government benefits, but the argument also extends to
indirect services. For example, our public/private “hidden” welfare state depends heavily
on privately run programs, such as employer-provided health care and retirement plans,
unemployment insurance, tort liability, and labor and workplace protections, all of which
at some level require the administration of competent lawyers. See generally, Jacob Hacker,
The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Social Benefits in the United
States (2002); Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping
of America’s Public-Private Welfare State (2003). Moreover, many of our public
transfer programs are through the tax system—for example, the earned income and child tax
credits, the successful administration of which again necessitates a role for attorneys to help
navigate the interaction between individuals and the state. See, e.g., Christopher Howard,
The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States
(1997). And, given the increasing and unidirectional growth in the complexity of our world,
these demands will only increase. See, e.g., John R. Brooks, Quasi-Public Spending, 104 Geo. L.J.
1057 (2016).

4.

The cost disease is not the only cause of increases in the cost of legal education. For example,
law schools have also been driven by the marketplace to offer expanded clinical and bar
exam training. But even holding the package of services constant, the cost disease would still
predict above-inflation growth in prices. See infra Part III.A.
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disease requires some socialization of the costs. There are any number of tools
we could use to do this, but in the context of legal education, a major tool for
socializing these costs is the income-driven repayment (“IDR”) program for
federal student loans.
From 2008 to 2015, through a series of statutory and regulatory changes,
Congress and the Obama administration dramatically reshaped the student
loan system, and by extension our country’s system of higher education finance
generally.5 By 2018, 90% of all student lending is directly from the federal
government,6 and all of those loans (and most earlier loans) can, using one
of the IDR programs, be paid back on an income-contingent basis, typically
as 10% of discretionary income for twenty years, followed by forgiveness of
the remaining loan balance. In effect, all higher education, including legal
education, can be paid for by sharing a portion of one’s income with the federal
government, much as we use the income tax to pay for other governmentprovided goods and services.
IDR has quietly become a massively important part of higher education
finance. As of the second quarter of 2019, 48% of the Department of Education’s
loan portfolio in repayment was enrolled in one of the IDR plans—that’s $469
billion of student debt owed by over 8 million borrowers.7 And because of the
way the plans are designed, income-contingent loans are particularly important
in funding law school and other graduate and professional education. While
an undergraduate can borrow at most $57,500 from the federal government
(and typically closer to $27,000)8, a graduate or professional student can
borrow up to the full cost of attendance.9 That amount is set by each school
and includes costs of living; it can be $100,000 per year for law school.10
Because of the intimate connection between legal education and legal
services, and the similar effects of the cost disease on each, this article calls
for understanding income-contingent student loans not just as a way to help
individuals afford law school, but as at least part of a broader set of policies
5.

See John R. Brooks, The Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability by Expanding Income-Driven
Repayment, 2018 Utah L. Rev. 847, 849-66 [hereinafter Case for More Debt] (discussing legislative
and regulatory history); John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher
Education, 104 Geo L.J. 229, 251-53 (2016) [hereinafter Income-Driven Repayment] (discussing
legislative and regulatory history).

6.

Coll. Bd., Trends In Student Aid 2018, at 15 fig.6 (2018). https://trends.collegeboard.org/
student-aid.

7.

Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Direct Loan Portfolio by Repayment Plan, Federally
Managed Portfolio by Repayment Plan tab, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/
student/portfolio (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).

8.

See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.

9.

See infra note 69 and accompanying text.

10.

See, e.g., Costs and Budgeting: Standard Cost of Attendance, Columbia Law School, https://www.law.
columbia.edu/financial-aid/costs-and-billing/costs-budgeting (2019-2020 cost of attendance
of $101,345);Student Expense Budget, NYU Law School, http://www.law.nyu.edu/financialaid/
budgetandbudgeting/studentexpensebudget (2019-2020 cost of attendance of $99,850).
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to increase access to justice in our country. This article proceeds as follows.
Part II shows the rising costs of both legal education and legal services,
and how they have followed similar paths. Part III roots this cost growth
in the cost disease, and explains how the cost disease works and what its
implications are, particularly for legal education and legal services. Part IV
explains why managing the cost disease requires some socialization of the
costs, i.e., spreading the costs widely across a society, and in a progressive
way. Part V argues that income-contingent loans partially serve this role. This
part also takes a critical look at the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program,
counterintuitively arguing that it has serious flaws in its goal of serving the
broader public interest. Part VI concludes.
II. Rising Costs
In this part I briefly review some of the data regarding rising costs of both
legal education and legal services. At least for the period of 1999 to 2013,
for which we have the fullest data, the costs appear to have risen roughly
the same amount, around 75% over that fifteen-year period. (An important
exception is public law school tuition, about which more below.) This growth
is significantly faster than overall inflation (the Consumer Price Index grew
around 40% over that period), or even the inflation indexes that track higher
education costs (which grew around 57% over that period).
What follows is not intended as a rigorous statistical analysis, in part because
it is difficult to get a truly accurate picture of the cost of legal education due
to of a lack of public data, and also because there will always be a number of
confounding factors, not the least of which is that the United States faced
two deep recessions during this fifteen-year period. Moreover, both legal
education and legal services underwent significant structural changes during
this time. What I want to illustrate is not so much rigorous numbers as broad
trends, which I hope would be roughly the same in direction and magnitude
regardless of particular methodological choices.
A. The Rising Cost of Legal Education
It is abundantly clear that nominal law school tuition and fees (i.e., listed
tuition and fees before accounting for financial aid and other discounting)11
have been rising rapidly for decades. According to the American Bar
Association, average in-state tuition for public law schools rose from $2,006
in 1985 to $23,879 in 2013, an increase of over 1000% over twenty-nine years
(an average annual growth rate of about 9.3%).12 Private law school tuition
and fees rose from $7,526 to $41,985, an increase of over 450% (6.35% per
11.

For simplicity I just refer to “tuition” hereafter unless otherwise specified.

12.

Statistics Archives, Law School Tuition (1985-2013; Public/Private), Am. Bar Assoc., https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/statistics-archives/
(last
visited Aug. 6, 2019).
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year).13 Over the 1999-2013 period, these annual growth rates were 8.62% and
5.18%, respectively. By contrast, inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price
Index, has averaged more like 2.47% per year during that period.14 (Table 1
summarizes these and other growth rates.)
But focusing only on schools’ posted gross tuition is a mistake, since schools
have always discounted their tuition based on both student need and merit.
Moreover, school discounting appears to be increasing in recent years, slowing
the overall growth rate in net tuition. Data are hard to come by, since schools
are fairly tight with their proprietary data. The ABA published discounted net
tuition data for public and private law schools for the years 1999, 2004, 2009,
and 2013, which show discount rates for public schools rising from 19% to 30%
and for private schools from 15% to 26%.15
Figure 1 shows the growth of gross and net tuition over these periods (with
a shorter period for net tuition, covering 1999-2013, the range of years that
the ABA’s discounting information covers). To generate the chart, I simply
assumed linear growth in discount rates between the years for which we have
data. The chart shows that the growth rate for net tuition is slightly slower
than the growth rate for gross tuition, with the rise in discount rates partially
offsetting the more accelerated growth of gross tuition in recent years. Net
tuition for public schools rises at an average growth rate of 7.65% and for
private schools at 4.14% during this period. The rates are still high, but
materially slower than that the 8.62% and 5.18% rates for gross tuition.
The faster rise of public law school tuition (net and gross) deserves some
further discussion. As we will see below, private school net tuition tracks more
closely with the growth rate for legal services. But public law school tuition,
even net of a generous average 30% discount rate, has risen at a substantially
higher rate. (Figure 2, which is scaled to have 1999=100, shows clearly how
much public net tuition growth is an outlier compared with the growth in
other costs.) The causes of cost growth in legal education, and in higher
education in general, are heavily debated, but one cause that seems fairly
certain for public schools is the decline in direct state government funding
for higher education.16 This is particularly true for law schools, many of which
13.

Id.

14.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI-All Urban Consumers (Current Series), https://www.bls.gov/cpi/
data (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).

15.

Author’s calculations based on American Bar Association, Task Force on the Financing
of Legal Education, Report 22-30 figs.4a, 4b, 5a, 5c [https://perma.cc/C8HW-H56W].
These are average numbers, and so they likely mask wide disparities across schools and
across students. In particular, many law schools increased merit-based discounts in the early
2010s as application numbers decreased.

16.

See, e.g., Douglas A. Webber, State Disinvestment and Tuition at Public Institutions, 66 Econ. Ed.
Rev. 1, 3 (2017) (finding that as much as 41.2% of public tuition increases is due to state
disinvestment); Sandy Baum et al., Tuition and State Appropriations: Using Evidence and Logic to Gain
Perspective 16, Urban Institute Report (2018) (summarizing research showing “somewhere
between 25 and 50 percent of an appropriations cut offset by tuition increase”).
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have become essentially private institutions, with barely any government
support at all. This confounds the data, since nominal tuition data reflect not
only increases in the total cost of providing legal education, but also a shift in
the source of payments, from state governments to students. Since private law
schools never had state funding to lose, their tuition growth likely tracks more
closely to underlying cost growth than public school tuition does.
B. Rising Cost of Legal Services
The rising cost of legal services seems to receive less attention as a public
policy issue (at least among law professors) than the rising cost of legal
education, but it is still a very real and important phenomenon. It is also more
difficult to track, because of the diffusion of both legal service providers and
those who pay for legal services. Purchasers of legal services include everyone
from corporations paying over $1000 per hour for white-shoe New York firms
to local governments paying court-appointed attorneys, and even to in-house
counsel.
Since I am more interested in growth rates than absolute costs, I am using
the data from the Producer Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.17 The BLS data go back only to 1997, but there appears to have been
a methodological change in 1999, so I look at the index just from 1999 to 2013.
Over this period, the PPI index for legal services experienced an average
annual growth rate of 3.94%.18 As with legal education, this is significantly
faster than the growth in overall consumer prices, which averaged 2.2% over
the period.19
C. Comparing Cost Growth in Legal Education and Legal Services
Figure 2 shows the relative increases in net tuition for public and private law
schools and for legal services, alongside the increases in CPI and a measure of
inflation in higher education, the Higher Education Price Index (“HEPI”),20
for the period 1999-2013 and all scaled so that 1999=100 for all the cost measures.
As noted above, public law school net tuition is a clear outlier, in part
because it reflects not just rising costs but also cuts in direct state government
funding. But looking at the other measures shows higher education costs in
general rising about one-and-a-half times faster than overall prices, and both
17.

Even if one might have doubts about the components of the index (something I do not have
the expertise to judge), my hope is that any errors are at least consistent over time, so that
growth in the index is still reflective of the growth in overall costs.

18.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, PPI Industry Group Data for Legal Services, https://www.bls.gov/ppi/
data.htm (last visited Sept, 4, 2019).

19.

See CPI-All Urban Consumers, supra note 14. This is a slightly slower rate that noted at note 14
because I am looking at the 1999-2017 period.

20.

Commonfund Institute, Commonfund Higher Education Price Index, 2016 Update 3, tbl. a,
https://www.commonfund.org/commonfund-institute/higher-education-price-index-hepi.
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private law school net tuition and legal services rising at about twice the rate
of inflation.
The key takeaway here is the very similar growth trajectory of the cost of
legal education and the cost of legal services. I discuss in the next section why
it is not surprising, and even expected, for the costs of these two services to rise
at similar rates. But we should also understand that if we think the rising cost
of legal education is a crisis, then the very same logic applies to legal services
as well. And because of the intimate connection between these two services, we
should think about common solutions.
III. Understanding the Cost Disease
While there are likely many and varied reasons for the rising costs of both
legal education and legal services, a likely cause of at least some of that rise
is simply that both are labor-intensive services, which in general see costs
rise faster than inflation—an economic phenomenon often called “Baumol’s
cost disease.”21 The cost disease helps to explain the ever-increasing costs
of a number of goods and services in the economy, including health care,
education, policing, firefighting, and social services.
I explain the cost disease briefly below, but at the outset it is worth noting
that the label “disease” is somewhat of a misnomer, as we will see. The cost
disease is fundamentally a product of healthy economic forces; furthermore,
cost increases caused by the cost disease are affordable by definition. The cost
disease raises difficult public policy challenges, but it is ultimately a political,
not economic, problem.22
The essence of the cost disease is that as wages rise over time, industries that
are not able easily to increase the productivity of their workers will see their
prices rise along with wages. The clearest example is the one used by William
Baumol and William Bowen in their first paper on the subject: live performing
arts.23 It takes the same number of actors the same amount of time to perform
Henry IV Part I today as it did in 1600—the labor productivity of live theater
actors has barely budged in 400 years. Yet actors do not expect to earn 1600era real wages, since costs and standards of living are much higher today. To
generate funds to support those higher wages, ticket prices must go up as well.
The story gets a bit more complex when considering the source of wage
growth. There is of course a lot that goes into the determination of wages,
21.

See, e.g., William J. Baumol, The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health
Care Doesn’t (2012).

22.

I am not saying that all cost increases are healthy or appropriate. Cost increases driven by,
e.g., mismanagement, rent-seeking, supply or demand shortages, etc., are real problems. I
am just making the narrower point that cost increases as a result only of the cost disease are not
inherently an economic problem, even if they can be a political or public choice problem. See
William J. Baumol, Health Care, Education and the Cost Disease: A Looming Crisis for Public Choice, 77
Pub. Choice 17 (1993).

23.

William J. Baumol & William G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their Economic
Problems, 55 Am. Econ. Rev. 495 (1965).
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including the relative bargaining power of labor and capital. But the ability
for firms to pay higher wages comes largely from improvements in labor
productivity due to the investment of capital and from innovations and
inventions. The capital and innovations let a given worker produce more
output—through the use of tools, machines, training, technology, etc. At least
some of that increased output will go to the worker in the form of higher
wages.24
But these wage increases do not affect workers in these high-labor productivity
industries only. Upward pressure on wages in the high-productivity sectors
cause wages to rise in low-productivity sectors as well, since all sectors have
to draw from the same labor market.25 But the low-productivity sectors do
not have the same increase in output per worker. If their labor costs go up,
the prices for the goods and services have to go up as well. In contrast, highproductivity sectors can often pay higher wages even as real prices for their
goods and services fall.
Returning to the performing arts example, we can also see how innovation
and productivity can counteract the cost disease. Inventions such as audio
and video recording, radio, movies, TV, and the Internet have made the
creation and distribution of entertainment vastly more cost-effective, so that
a given performance can now reach millions of people at an affordable price.
But this underscores the point that the key is technological innovation; for
industries like education where (effective) teaching technology is lacking,26
the cost disease continues to be dominant. Moreover, it also highlights that
the innovation in question often involves substitution—e.g., switching from
live to recorded performances. These are not necessarily equivalent products,
and as long as there remains a demand for live performance (or live classroom
teaching), the cost disease will continue to play a role.
24.

This is not to say that productivity necessarily leads to wage growth, and there is evidence
that in recent decades much of the growth in output from labor productivity has accrued to
owners of capital. See, e.g., Economic Policy Institute, The Productivity-Pay Gap, https://www.
epi.org/productivity-pay-gap (last visited Sept. 4, 2019). But it remains the case that for
there to be any real wage growth over time, labor productivity has to increase.

25.

Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, Why Does College Cost So Much? 36-37
(2011); Baumol, Cost Disease, supra note 21, at 21 (“In the long run, wages for all workers
throughout a country’s economy tend to go up and down together.”).

26.

Studies generally conclude that in-person education continues to be superior to online
education. See, e.g., Cassandra M.D. Hart, Elizabeth Friedmann & Michael Hill, Online CourseTaking and Student Outcomes in California Community Colleges, 13 Educ. Fin. & Pol’y 42 (2018); Di
Xu & Shanna S. Jaggars, Performance Gaps Between Online and Face-to-Face Courses: Differences Across
Types of Students and Academic Subject Areas, 85 J. Higher Educ. 633 (2014); David Figlio, Mark
Rush & Lu Yin, Is It Live or Is It Internet? Experimental Estimates of the Effects of Online Instruction on
Student Learning, 31 J. Lab. Econ. 763 (2013). But see William G. Bowen, Matthew M. Chingos,
Kelly A. Lack & Thomas I. Nygren, Interactive Learning Online at Public Universities: Evidence from
a Six-Campus Randomized Trial, 33 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 94 (2014) (finding learning
outcomes essentially the same for online and in-person).
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A. Cost Disease in Legal Education
After live performing arts, education is perhaps the industry that best fits
the cost-disease story.27 A given teacher or professor has a pretty hard upward
bound on the number of students that he or she can teach—there is only so
much time to grade papers and tests, and only so much space in a classroom
or lecture hall. But teachers and professors still expect their wages to rise over
time, and if those wages rise faster than inflation, then so will the costs of
education generally.
To be sure, professors’ salaries are not the only sources of cost increases in
higher education. As schools have started providing a broader range of services,
administrative and capital expenses have also risen. And, as in every industry,
there is also likely a degree of waste and rent-seeking. But classes taught or led
by professors remain the central product of higher education. According to
Department of Education data, total compensation (salary plus benefits)28 for
professors grew at around 3.8% a year between 1998 and 2011.29 Good data on
law professors specifically is hard to come by, but we can probably assume that
law professors’ salaries grew at a similar rate. This falls a bit short of the 4.14%
average growth rate for private school net tuition, but is in the same ballpark,
and substantially more than average CPI of around 2%.30
27.

Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 5, 239-42; see generally Archibald & Feldman, supra
note 25.

28.

It is important to include the value of benefits, since it is an increasingly important portion
of overall compensation, and because it has been rising faster than cash wages. See infra notes
39-40 and accompanying text.

29.

To calculate this I used salary data for full professors and average benefits per full-time
faculty member since NCES data did not separate out benefits by academic rank. I used full
professor salary on the assumption that law schools generally rely on tenured faculty whose
salaries are at the top end of overall faculty salaries. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Digest of Educ. Statistics, tbls. 316.10 & 316.70 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/digest/current_tables.asp.

30.

Two other theories of cost growth in higher education are Bowen’s revenue theory of
costs and the related Bennett hypothesis. Briefly, the revenue theory of costs argues that,
because schools are mission-driven and compete over prestige, they will tend to absorb
all sources of revenue provided to them by increasing spending. Howard R. Bowen, The
Costs of Higher Education (1980). The Bennett hypothesis (named for former Secretary
of Education William Bennett) is related and argues that schools will absorb all forms of
aid into higher tuition, without any net benefit for students. William J. Bennett, Our Greedy
Colleges, N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 1987), at A31, http://nyti.ms/2GGiqB3. The evidence for these
theories is mixed. See Archibald & Feldman, supra note 25, at 92-113 (on Bowen and related
theories of dysfunction); 201-06 & 267-69 (on Bennett). Moreover, there is some evidence
that the Bennett hypothesis has not affected law school prices in particular. Robert Kelchen,
An Empirical Examination of the Bennett Hypothesis in Law School Prices, SSRN Working Paper (Nov.
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067252. But even if Bowen and Bennett describe real
effects, neither is necessarily in conflict with the cost disease. The cost disease describes
market forces on wages and related costs in low-productivity industries; the revenue
theory of costs and the Bennett hypothesis speak more to the budget constraint—that is,
the relative availability of the funds to pay those higher costs. In contrast, consider public
K-12 education, where political constraints on tax increases have constrained teacher wage
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It is worth noting that there are—of course—productivity improvements in
higher education. For undergraduate education, the main ways that schools
have tried to improve productivity are by using cheaper labor, like graduate
students and adjunct professors, and by offering online courses. These tools
have had perhaps less of an effect on law school than on undergraduate
education, but even if they come to be used widely, it is not clear at all that
they would precipitate the sort of productivity improvements that could
substantially slow or reverse cost increases.31 For one thing, they still rely heavily
on labor. Even online courses still need graders, discussion leaders, and so on,
and these workers would expect raises. Moreover, these interventions likely
have a negative effect on quality, and delivering a lower-quality product at
the same price is just as inflationary as delivering the same quality at a higher
price.32 There will likely always be a demand for full-time professors teaching
live in a classroom, and that product will remain expensive. Indeed, law
schools have also faced pressures to increase in-person teaching; the push for
clinical education and bar exam preparation courses, and for smaller classes
generally, puts upward pressure on labor costs.33
But even allowing for all the technological interventions that have improved
teaching and research productivity—like digital research and communication,
online course management, and computer technology in general—does not
counter the cost-disease story. The cost disease requires only low productivity
growth, not none at all. As long as productivity gains lag behind wage growth,
costs will continue to rise faster than inflation. Even the most techno-optimist
visions of online or AI-driven education are unlikely to match the exponential
growth in labor productivity we have seen in, say, agriculture, an industry that
has gone from employing the majority of all workers in 187034 to practically no
one today,35 even while increasing output to enormous levels.
growth in many school districts. See, e.g., Sylvia Allegretto & Lawrence Mishel, The Teacher Pay
Gap Is Wider than Ever, Economic Policy Institute Report (2016), https://www.epi.org/
publication/the-teacher-pay-gap-is-wider-than-ever-teachers-pay-continues-to-fall-furtherbehind-pay-of-comparable-workers. Instead of teacher wage increases, we see growing class
sizes and teacher strikes. The cost disease cannot be willed away.
31.

For a fuller discussion of this point, see Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 5, at 242-44.

32.

See, e.g., Baumol, supra note 21, at 20-21 (noting that demands for higher labor productivity in
health care can lead to a decline in quality).

33.

See, e.g., Archibald & Feldman, supra note 25, at 72-73 (noting this general trend throughout
higher education and its corresponding demand on resources).

34.

U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Statistics
1970, at 138 (1975).

35.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment by Major Industry Sector, https://www.bls.gov/emp/
tables/employment-by-major-industry-sector.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) (showing
roughly 1.5% of the labor force employed in agriculture in 2016).
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B. Cost Disease in Legal Services
The same basic story applies in legal services: a fundamentally laborintensive exercise that has seen some technological innovations that improve
productivity somewhat, but not on nearly the scale that would be required to
slow or reverse real cost growth. Beyond the general labor-saving technologies,
like e-mail and word processing, innovations like online legal databases and
text-analyzing discovery software have shortened the amount of time lawyers
and other legal workers spend on these tasks. And we are told that an AIdriven future without lawyers is just around the corner. But the bedrock service
provided by attorneys—representation in court and other legal proceedings—
remains as labor-intensive as ever, and no foreseeable technology can replace
it. As with legal education, attempts to save money—e.g., by pushing people
into arbitration or settlement, using do-it-yourself online services, or simply
appearing pro se—likely mean a lower-quality product, and thus do not actually
address inflationary pressures.
While the Producer Price Index for legal services rose an average of 3.76%
between 1999 and 2017,36 hourly lawyer wages grew at an average rate of 2.59%
over that period, according to BLS data.37 But these data come from the
Occupational Employment Statistics survey, which does not include benefits,
such as health care and retirement plan contributions.38 BLS data from
the National Compensation Survey show that the benefits portion of total
compensation for all civilian workers has been rising at a rate of around 3.4%
in recent years,39 compared with 2.4% for wages and salaries.40 Extrapolating,
we can probably assume that overall lawyer compensation grew at closer to
3.6% annually, very close to the growth rate in the cost of legal services, again
supporting the claim that rising costs are largely a function of rising wages.
IV. Curing the Cost Disease
The previous section argued that the cost disease may help to explain the
rising costs of both legal education and legal services, since both are laborintensive industries not well-suited to the productivity-enhancing technologies
that have flourished in some other industries. And the compensation data for
law professors and for lawyers also fit reasonably well with that story, with
both rising materially faster than overall inflation, and fairly close to the rise
36.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, PPI Industry Group Data for Legal Services, https://www.bls.gov/ppi/
data.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2019).

37.

Author’s calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics,
https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2018).

38.

See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions, https://
www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2019)

39.

Author’s calculations based on Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee
Compensation, All Civilian Total Benefits for All Occupations, Cost per Hour, 2004-2018, https://www.bls.
gov/data (last visited Aug. 28, 2018)

40.

Id.

532

Journal of Legal Education

in overall costs for legal education and legal services, respectively, especially
when total compensation is considered.41
So far, this story sounds truly bleak—costs for necessary services rising ever
faster, with little that we can do to stop it other than suppressing wage growth
or substituting inferior products or services—more MOOCs and mandatory
arbitrations, more adjunct professors and online legal forms. But labeling
this phenomenon a “disease” is actually too negative, since it is a product
of positive economic forces—productivity and wage growth. Moreover,
those same forces can end up curing the cost disease. The same productivity
improvements that drive wage growth also create the savings needed to pay for
that cost growth—that is, an economy as a whole will always be able to afford
cost increases because of the cost disease. The catch is that income and wealth
inequality make it such that a given individual may not be able to afford the cost
increases. Ultimately, the cost disease ends up being a distributional issue that
requires us to make difficult choices about whether to limit goods such as legal
education and legal services to only those with the most resources, or whether
to socialize and share the costs.
A. Enough Money in the Economy
Before turning to the distributional implications of the cost disease, we
should understand that rising costs as a result of wage growth in sectors
without corresponding productivity gains are affordable to the economy as
a whole. Recall that the driver of wage growth in this story is rising labor
productivity in some sectors of the economy. A given worker, using capital,
technological innovation, and skills can produce more output per hour of
work, and at least some of that comes back to the worker in the form of higher
wages. But those same productivity improvements can also drive down real
prices for the goods being produced or otherwise free up economic resources.
In essence, the money we save on lower prices for toasters and televisions can
be used to pay the higher prices for education and legal services (and health
care and other cost-disease-afflicted goods and services).42 The overall bundle
of goods society consumes does not need to change much at all, even if the
allocation of money within the bundle changes a lot.
Another way to think about it is that if cost-disease price increases mostly
track labor compensation growth—as they do for legal education and legal
services—then, on average, people can pay the rising costs out of their rising
labor incomes. If for some reason productivity slows such that wage growth
slows as well, then that also slows the upward pressure on the costs of laborintensive services, keeping the services affordable on average.
41.

It should be noted that professors and lawyers are far from the only people employed in legal
education and legal services. But the same general argument applies, since the industries in
general are labor-intensive; there is not a ton of room for massive productivity improvement
among administrative and support employees at law schools, for example.

42.

See Baumol, Cost Disease, supra note 21, 43-58.
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Now, this is obviously a vastly oversimplified story. Three issues in particular
make addressing the cost disease much more challenging. First, capital’s share
of income appears to be rising, in part because capital is taking a bigger share
of the gains from productivity improvements than economic theory suggests
should happen in a competitive labor market.43 Some suggest this is because
of monopsony conditions among employers,44 the decline of labor unions,45
and other factors that limit the bargaining power of labor.46 But why it is
happening is beyond the scope of this article; I observe only that labor may be
capturing fewer of the rewards of productivity gains in the form of wages than
we might hope. This may not necessarily be a problem for the cost disease,
however, since limited wage growth could also limit price increases in laborintensive services. But the next point challenges that.
Second, growing inequality, even just in labor income, makes the effects
of cost growth vary depending on where one is in the income distribution.
Professionals and those with college degrees have seen decent wage growth,
while working- and middle-class workers have not.47 So looking only at
average wage growth masks important distributional differences. Those most
struggling to keep up with cost-disease-driven inflation in health care and
education are also those who are receiving the least gains from productivitydriven wage growth. At the same time, as we have seen, the wages of those who
work in legal education (and higher education generally) and legal services
have risen, driving the costs of those services higher.48 In other words, the
divergence in wage growth between professionals and those with college
degrees versus others is not only a driver of inequality in its own right, but also
drives further inequality in the ability to afford goods and services affected by
the cost disease.
43.

See, e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Share of Output Has
Declined Since 1947 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/labor-share-of-outputhas-declined-since-1947.htm; Economic Policy Institute, The Productivity-Pay Gap (Aug. 2018),
https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap.

44.

See, e.g., Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, More and More Companies Have Monopoly Power Over
Workers’ Wages. That’s Killing the Economy, Vox (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/
2018/4/6/17204808/wages-employers-workers-monopsony-growth-stagnation-inequality.

45.

See, e.g., Karl Russell, Ben Casselman, Patricia Cohen, Conor Dougherty & Noam Scheiber,
6 Reasons that Pay Has Lagged Behind U.S. Job Growth, N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2018), https://nyti.
ms/2FAKPGO.

46.

Id.

47.

See, e.g., Elise Gould, Looking at the Latest Wage Data by Education Level, Economic Policy
Institute Blog (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.epi.org/blog/looking-at-the-latest-wage-databy-education-level.

48.

See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra note 29; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Employment Statistics, supra 37 and accompanying text; Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn, Why
Wages Aren’t Growing in America, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/whywages-arent-growing-in-america (noting distribution differences in wage growth).
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Third, as noted above, much of the growth in total labor compensation
has gone to benefits, especially employer-provided health insurance.49 So even
where labor has captured some of the gains from productivity improvements,
those gains have largely gone to pay the rising cost of health care, another
service afflicted by the cost disease. Health care is a complicated issue that is
(thankfully) beyond the scope of this article, but even if we make the heroic
assumption that all of the cost increases in health care are wholly attributable
to the cost disease (in which case they would not necessarily by a bad thing),
the fact that health care is generally paid upfront by employers or through
paycheck withholding means that it may partly crowd out other goods and
services with rising costs, particularly for those individuals with slow or flat
wage growth. As evidenced by the slower growth in cash wages compared with
overall compensation, health care’s first bite at the apple leaves less for other
goods and services.
The challenge, therefore, is that while the cost disease story tells us that
there ought to be enough resources in an economy to afford rising prices in
low-labor-productivity growth industries such as legal education and legal
services, the distribution of those resources among individuals and households
can still make some goods and services unaffordable for large swaths of society.
Ultimately, the cost disease is an issue not of economic efficiency but rather of
equity and fairness.
B. Socializing the Costs
A first-best solution to the distributional issues created by the cost disease
is to improve distribution, i.e., to generate policies that drive wage growth,
especially in the lower ends of the income distribution.50 Barring that, the other
choices available are 1) top-down cost controls,51 2) rationing by income, or 3)
some socializing of the costs. In my view, the first is unacceptable for economic
reasons52 and the second for justice and fairness reasons, which means we are
49.

See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation, supra note 39 and
accompanying text; Anna Stansbury & Lawrence Summers, Productivity and Pay: Is the Link
Broken?, NBER Working Paper No. 24165, at 8-9 and n.7 (2017).

50.

The growth would have to be significant, since we would need wages to catch up to where
they should be to match the growth that has occurred in education and higher education,
plus continue to grow along with those costs going forward. This could have the potential
to increase cost-disease pressures, since presumably at least some of those higher wages
would be paid to individuals working in low-productivity industries, driving prices in those
industries yet higher.

51.

Recall that by assumption I am addressing cost increases arising from the cost disease, i.e.,
due to market-driven wage growth in low-productivity growth industries. To the degree that
there are other factors affecting costs, like waste, rent-seeking, or monopoly, other policy
tools should be considered.

52.

Recall that cost-disease price increases reflect the real costs of providing the good or
service. Forcing price controls could therefore make production of the goods or services
uneconomical.
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left trying to figure out some way to spread the costs across society, to bear
them collectively and progressively.
In the context of legal education and legal services, what would this entail?
The most basic tool for socializing a good or service in this way is government
itself. From a public finance perspective, government is just a group of people
coming together to collectively acquire goods and services that the private
market cannot provide well or at all.53 Government can get around the collective
action, asymmetrical information, and intergenerational problems that can
lead to market failure, and it can also provide a mechanism—progressive
taxation—for paying for goods in a way that is affordable for everyone. If
we believe, as I have argued here, that we are underproviding legal services,
and therefore also underproviding legal education, in part because of cost
pressures that are largely a function of income and wealth inequality, then
perhaps government should step in and provide these services directly. All
law schools become direct-funded public institutions and all legal services are
government-provided, with progressive taxes used to pay the associated costs.
Of course there would be a number of problems with this approach. First,
the politics of raising taxes and expanding the public sector to that degree is
challenging, to say the least. Second, the services would be provided regardless
of ability to pay, which could end up being a regressive transfer, or at least
more generous to higher-income individuals than necessary, since many of
those individuals can afford to pay out of pocket.54 Third, and probably most
importantly, it would severely affect the independence of both the academy
and the bar, two professions that thrive on freedom from unnecessary
government intrusion. For the bar in particular, much of its most important
work is challenging unlawful government action; that role could be threatened
if every lawyer were an employee of the government.
These are simplistic objections to a simplistic proposal. More sophisticated
proposals might generate different responses, but it is not my purpose here
to unpack all the possible forms of government funding for these services.
Instead, I want to argue that income-contingent loans, as currently embodied
in the income-driven repayment program, provide at least a partial pathway to
progressive public funding while avoiding some of the worst objections above.
V. The Partial Solution of IDR and PSLF
The problem as laid out so far is the following: Legal services are vital
and necessary services in our democracy, particularly in an era of large
government and complex regulation. But our country is far short of meeting
the demand for legal services, in part because of the high costs of the labor53.

For an articulation of this “public finance” view of government and the competing “public
choice” view, see generally James M. Buchanan & Richard A. Musgrave, Public Finance and
Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State (1999).

54.

See John Brooks, Brian Galle & Brendan Maher, Cross-Subsidies: Government’s Hidden
Pocketbook, 106 Geo. L.J. 1229, 1261-66 (discussing the issue of inframarginal individuals and
summarizing research).

536

Journal of Legal Education

intensive service of lawyering. Producing lawyers is also expensive, which in
turns exacerbates the cost pressures on legal services, since lawyers may feel
the need to recoup the significant private investment they have made in their
human capital, and many schools cannot feasibly lower their prices. Providing
sufficient direct funding to fund both legal services and legal education would
be politically and fiscally challenging, and furthermore could undermine the
vital independence of both the academy and the bar.
I argue in this part that income-contingent loans can provide a solution to
this problem, though only a partial and imperfect one. They are not the only
solution, of course, but since they are a policy tool already in place we should
begin to see them not just as a narrow tool to help law and other students afford
their student loans, but rather as a broader mechanism to secure sufficient,
progressive funding to pay not only for legal education, but for legal services
in general.
In this part, I first lay out some of the details of the loan programs. They
are complex, and I omit some of the fine print here in service of the larger
conceptual and policy argument. (I refer interested readers to some of my
other work to understand the programs in more detail.55) I then explain why
these loans can serve as a progressive funding mechanism for legal education
and, by extension, legal services. Finally, I take a closer look at the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness program in particular and explain why, despite
good intentions, it does not fit well into this broader conception of the role of
income-contingent loans.
A. Income-Driven Repayment Programs (“IDR”)
The Department of Education has several different programs under the
heading of income-driven repayment: Income-Based Repayment (IBR), Pay
As You Earn (PAYE), and Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE).56 IBR actually
comes in two forms, depending on the type and vintage of the loan. And there
is also an early, less generous program, Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR),
that started in the 1990s, but never had much adoption. Finally, Public Service
Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) can also apply to any loan.
This alphabet soup of programs makes summarizing the program details
difficult, and mostly beyond the scope of this paper. For our purposes, we can
generalize somewhat. First, the programs allow borrowers to make monthly
loan payments that are no more than (usually) 10% of “discretionary income,”
where discretionary income is (usually) the borrower’s adjusted gross income
minus 150% of the relevant federal poverty threshold.57 After twenty to twenty55.

See Brooks, Case for More Debt, supra note 5; Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 5.

56.

See Brooks, Case for More Debt, supra note 5, at 849-56. For a review of the major features of
each program; see also Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Income-Driven Plans, https://
studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-driven.

57.

34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(a)(2)(i) (2018) (PAYE); 685.209(c)(2)(i) (2018) (REPAYE); and
685.221(b)(1) (2018) (IBR).
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five years (or ten years for those in PSLF58), any remaining loan balance is
forgiven.59 The programs differ most substantially in their rules for interest
accrual and capitalization, which can make an enormous difference over the
life of the loan, even though the rules may not always be clear to borrowers ex
ante.60
Two other differences in the programs are worth mention. First, in all
of the programs except for REPAYE, a borrower pays the lesser of 10% of
discretionary income or the standard loan repayment amount.61 So when a
borrower’s income gets high enough, she reverts to a typical flat loan service
schedule. For REPAYE, by contrast, the borrower continues to pay 10% of
discretionary income no matter what her income.62 Second, for borrowers not
in PSLF, the forgiveness of the debt may create gross income for tax purposes,
meaning that in practice the full amount of the loan is not really forgiven.63
For PSLF, by contrast, the tax code explicitly excludes the amount of canceled
debt from gross income.64
B. IDR is Progressive Public Funding of Legal Education
The brief sketch of the programs above reveals that the IDR programs
can be thought of as a sort of income surtax on former students to pay for
higher education.65 The government provides the funds for tuition upfront,
and finances that payment by collecting a percentage of a graduate’s income;
that is not so far off from the way the government funds its other programs,
goods, and services largely through the personal income tax. Of course, there
are vast differences between the student loan program and the tax system,
especially the facts that the future obligation from a loan borrower is classified
as a balance sheet liability whereas future tax payments are not, that the
“surtax” here is only on former borrowers, and that the loan repayments end
58.

34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(iii) (2018).

59.

34 C.F.R. §§ 685.209(a)(6)(i) (2018) (PAYE); 685.209(c)(5)(ii)(A) (2018) (REPAYE); and
685.221(f)(1) (2018) (IBR).

60.

See Brooks, Case for More Debt, supra note 5, at 849-56 (reviewing and comparing interest rules).

61.

See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(4)(i)(A) (2018). A borrower in PAYE pays no more than what
the standard loan payment would be, even if the income-contingent payment would be
higher.

62.

The REPAYE regulations do not include a provision similar to 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(4)(i).
See Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 39,608, 39,618 (July 9, 2015)
(explaining this aspect of REPAYE).

63.

While this appears to be the accepted view, I think it is wrong as a matter of policy and is
also based on a misapplication of legal precedents. See John R. Brooks, Treasury Should Exclude
Income from Discharge of Student Loans, 152 Tax Notes 751 (Aug. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Brooks,
Student Loan Discharge].

64.

I.R.C. § 108(f) (2019).

65.

For expanded arguments on this point, see John R. Brooks, Student Loans as Taxes, 151 Tax
Notes 513 (Apr. 25, 2016); Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 5, at 258-63.
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after a period whereas tax obligations do not. But at a high level of generality,
income-contingent loans from the government are more analogous to tax
payments than they are to, say, standard commercial loans.
If that is so, then IDR provides a form of progressive funding for higher
education not so different from free tuition paid for with higher income taxes.66
And this is particularly true for law schools and other graduate and professional
schools. IDR essentially applies only to federal Direct Loans to students, and
Direct Loans to undergraduates are capped at fairly low amounts—a total of
$27,000 for a four-year student who is still a dependent of his or her parents,67
and a maximum of $57,500 for an independent student with more than four
years of schooling.68 But as of this writing, graduate and professional students
can borrow up to the full cost of attendance,69 an amount that includes not
just tuition and fees, but also the student’s expected cost of living.70 In other
words, it is not impossible for a law school to have its entire tuition revenue
come from IDR-eligible loans and for all of those loans to be paid back as
a percentage of its graduates’ income.71 In that case, the federal government
would essentially be taxing the law school’s graduates to cover the costs of
running the school.
This form of funding should be contrasted with other potential mechanisms
for paying for legal education, including direct government funding of schools
and direct grants to students. These are already part of the mix of revenue
sources used to pay for higher education (along with charitable contributions),
so the question is whether direct government funding should be relied on
more heavily in place of using tuition funded by income-contingent loans. As
noted above, the political challenges of direct funding are steep. But it is also
debatable whether direct funding would even be desirable.
Direct funding of schools at the levels needed to make up for tuition
revenue has the potential to be regressive, since the benefits would accrue to
all students, not just those most in need.72 It would be much more expensive to
66.

Especially when you consider that large majority of those with higher incomes went to
college.

67.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1078(b), 1078-8(d)(3) (2019).

68.

20 U.S.C. § 1078-8(d)(4)(B) (2019).

69.

Direct Loan limits for graduate and professional students are higher than for undergraduates.
34 C.F.R. §§ 685.203(b)(2)(iii), (c)(2) (2018) (annual limit of $20,500); id. at § 685.203(e)(3)
(lifetime limit of $138,500). But graduate and professional students can also take out Grad
PLUS loans up to the full cost of attendance, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 685.203(f), (g) (2018). Those
loans are also eligible for IDR, see, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(ii) (2018) (excepting from IDR
only Direct PLUS Loans made to parent borrowers, but not to student borrowers).

70.

20 U.S.C. § 1087ll (2019).

71.

Under the “90/10” rule, private for-profit schools can have at most 90% of their revenue from
federal student loans and other federal aid, but that rule does not apply to public and private
nonprofit schools. See 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(16) (2018).

72.

This would depend on how progressive the revenue source is. If free college were paid for
with, e.g., a wealth tax or higher rates on the highest-income taxpayers, the overall policy
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lower tuitions for everyone than to lower them only for those who cannot afford
current tuition levels. Furthermore, much of that money would be wasted
on inframarginal consumers, those who do not need additional subsidies to
change their behavior.73
Similarly, more generous grants to students, while better targeted to those
who have greater need ex ante, do little to help those who may struggle after
graduation. A law student from a poor family may go on to be a big-firm law
partner, and it is fair and equitable to ask that person to pay for the full cost
of her education rather than ask taxpayers to support her. Income-contingent
loans target their benefits to those who have the fewest monetary rewards from
their education, paid for by those with the most.74
Indeed, as currently structured, the student loan program overall is almost
entirely self-financing, meaning that the more successful borrowers subsidize
those in IDR. The estimated net cost of IDR to the government over the life
of a loan—due to delayed payments, interest subsidies, and loan forgiveness—is
almost entirely covered by the estimated profit from non-IDR loans, because of
relatively high interest rates (for 2018-2019 Grad PLUS loans charged 7.6%).75
According to Department of Education data, the “subsidy rate” for new loans
to students in 2019 is 0.14%.76 That is, the government estimates that over the
full lives of all new loans to students in 2019, it will collect 0.14% less than it
lends out on those loans, in present value,77 even after accounting for the likely
costs of IDR.78 That is a mere $117 million on loan volume of $85 billion. And
could be progressive. If funded with, e.g., a consumption tax, such as a value-added tax, the
overall policy could be regressive.
73.

See Brooks, Galle & Maher, supra note 54, at 1261-66 and accompanying text.

74.

See Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment, supra note 5, at 268-72.

75.

Federal Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Interest Rates and Fees, https://studentaid.ed.gov/
sa/types/loans/interest-rates (last visited Aug. 9, 2019).

76.

Author’s calculations based on data from U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Student Loans Overview, Fiscal
Year 2020 Budget Proposal, Q-25, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget20/
justifications/q-sloverview.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). In this calculation I am leaving out
loans consolidated in 2019 (because the set includes earlier loan cohorts) and also loans to
parents. Loans to parents are (mostly) not eligible for IDR, and, like loans to grad students,
charge high interest rates. They are therefore the most profitable for the government, with an
estimated subsidy rate of -34.43% (meaning that the government expects to collect 34.43%
more than it lends out to parents, in present value). Id. Consolidated loans, in contrast, have
some of the highest positive subsidy rates: 12.03% in 2019. Id. Including consolidated loans
and parent loans, the subsidy rate goes up to 0.61%, id., so even across the full portfolio of
2019 loans, the system is largely self-financing.

77.

By “present value,” I mean after discounting future payments to the current period using a
risk-free discount rate. Therefore, these subsidy rates (positive and negative) are calculated
after assuming an interest-like return for the time value of money. For example, a 0% subsidy
rate would still mean that the government had earned some interest, equal to the discount
rate used in calculating present value.

78.

The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 requires federal loan-making agencies to calculate
the cost of new loan disbursements as the difference between the net present value of loan
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for graduate loans—the ones used by law students—the government expects to
collect 2.3% more than it lends out in present value, even after accounting for
IDR.79 Essentially all of the cost of IDR is borne by borrowers who go on to
have income high enough to pay the full principal and interest on their loans,
and that is particularly true for lawyers.
To be clear, none of this is to say that financing legal education with incomecontingent loans clearly dominates direct government funding (or vice versa).
It is just to say that IDR does provide a form of progressive funding of higher
education, and that therefore the comparison between student loans and direct
government funding is more subtle and nuanced than we might first assume.
C. IDR Can Be Progressive Public Funding of Legal Services
An argument of this article is that the need for legal services cannot be
met with the current supply of lawyers, and this is in part because the cost
disease has pushed the costs of legal services out of reach of those who have
not seen sufficient wage gains over time, particularly after accounting for
the rising costs of other cost disease-afflicted services, like health care.80 In
essence, what a large segment of the population is able or willing to pay is not
sufficient to pay the costs and meet the wage expectations of a professional
with an expensive advanced degree. The implication of this is that to expand
the supply of legal services requires at least some socialization of the costs, just
as we have partially socialized the costs of health care and higher education.
Of course, we already do some amount of socialization for legal services.
Public defenders and legal aid corporations, for example, provide muchneeded services to low-income clients, subsidized by government and private
grants. But these do not come close to meeting the needs of clients dealing
with family, immigration, disability, housing, or other civil matters where
representation is not guaranteed, to say nothing of the often inadequate
representation in criminal proceedings.81 Moreover, this legal work is partially
subsidized by the lawyers themselves in the form of lower wages. Government and
public interest law jobs generally pay lower salaries than law firms or private
practice, and lawyers in private practice who serve low- and middle-income
individuals and families make lower salaries than those serving businesses
outlays and receipts over the full life of the loan. 2 U.S.C. §§ 661a(5), 661c (2012). This is
in contrast to budgeting for direct spending, which generally just counts outlays within a
ten-year budget window.
79.

Author’s calculations based on Student Loans Overview, supra note 76, at Q-25.

80.

Another cost that has grown faster than inflation for many households is the cost of housing.
The cost of housing is related to the cost disease, in the sense that construction is laborintensive and has limited opportunities for technological innovation to drive prices down.
But market prices seem to be driven much more by scarcity than these more structural
reasons, particular in desirable locations like New York City and other major cities. Some
zoning rules also have the effect of limiting productivity, since they can impede the ability to
build multiple housing units in a single building on a single parcel.

81.

See Legal Svcs. Corp., supra note 2.
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and high-net-worth individuals and families. This can be seen in part by the
well-known bimodal distribution of starting salaries for lawyers. According to
NALP, the average starting salary for the Class of 2016 is around $90,000, but
half of all law graduates actually start with an income under $65,000.82 The
average is skewed because of a cluster of around 16% of law graduates who
start out in large firms with starting salaries of $180,000 or more.83
Expanding legal services further into underserved areas may require
some degree of public or collective funding, but whether or not that is the
case, it will almost certainly require attorneys to continue to accept lower
wages for these kinds of work. But that is a heavy ask, to put a significant
part of the social cost of serving underserved clients onto the backs of the
lawyers themselves, particularly when they are also largely responsible for
the investment in their human capital. One way to spread at least some of
those costs more collectively is through IDR. By shifting some of the costs of
legal education off of the lawyers serving the neediest clients and onto more
financially successful lawyers (and, by extension, the clients they serve), IDR
can lead to somewhat more disposable income for these lawyers, helping to
ease some of the pressures of the cost disease on legal services.
To be clear, IDR is not a full solution for dealing with the many problems
of access to justice—far from it. But when we recall the deep connection
between legal education and legal services, we can see IDR not just as a tool
to benefit lawyers, but also as a tool to benefit the communities many lawyers
serve. Viewed in this way, IDR is a way of pooling at least some of the costs
of ensuring that everyone can navigate our increasingly legalized society and
administrative state.
D. The Promise and Problem of Public Service Loan Forgiveness
The argument above—that subsidizing some of the costs of legal education
can be a subsidy to expand legal services and access to justice—is also part
of the argument behind Public Service Loan Forgiveness.84 PSLF stands
somewhat apart from the more general IDR programs. IDR applies to
all borrowers, while PSLF applies only to borrowers working in particular
82.

Judith N. Collins, Jobs & JDs: Employment for the Class of 2016—Selected Findings, Nat’l Ass’n for
Law Placement 2-3 (2017), https://www.nalp.org/uploads/SelectedFindingsClassof2016.
pdf.
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well financially. Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43
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Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 27 (2007).
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government or public interest jobs.85 Under general IDR, the borrower pays
10% of his or her discretionary income and then qualifies for loan forgiveness
after twenty to twenty-five years (really only partial forgiveness under current
law, because the forgiveness is taxable).86 Under PSLF, the borrower still pays
10% of discretionary income, but qualifies for forgiveness after ten years (and
the forgiveness is tax-free).87 Thus, PSLF is substantially more generous than
general IDR (particularly because years eleven to twenty of a lawyer’s career
are likely to be much higher earning than years one to ten).
Critics of IDR suggest that the program is far too generous, especially to
lawyers and other professionals,88 but it is really the generosity of PSLF in
particular that is the source of their concerns. In my view, the generosity of
PSLF is not in and of itself a problem—it is quite reasonable for society as a
whole to bear the bulk of the cost of developing the skills of a person working
in the public interest.89 But the relative treatment of PSLF borrowers compared
with all other borrowers based on a bright, but arbitrary, line is less defensible.
First, there is simply the issue of need. Income, as imperfect as it is, is
our general metric of a person’s need and a person’s ability to pay. A lawyer
working in the private sector making income of $X has the same need and the
same ability to pay as a person working in the public sector making income of
$X. In taxation, we look at notions like horizontal equity to determine tax
fairness and justice. Our income tax says that by having the same income,
these two individuals have the same ability to pay taxes, and the source of
the income is largely irrelevant. It is not obvious why that answer should be
different for student loans, especially if we consider those loan payments to
similar to taxes.
Second, if measurement of need cannot explain the different treatment, can
we explain it in terms of programmatic goals? That is, can PSLF be defended
as a decision to invest more substantial public resources into educating those
who work in government or public interest careers compared with the private
sector? Perhaps, but the particular choices of how to measure that subsidy
are problematic. For one, the sharp line-drawing between what is a “public
interest” job and what is not belies a more nuanced reality. As this article
has argued, many attorneys in private practice also serve substantial public
interests, and we have a public interest in having even more attorneys in
private practice. Moreover, it is not clear why the ten-year mark is the point
at which to measure the subsidy. If forgiveness were at year twenty, and the
borrower continued to be in a relatively low-paying public interest job in years
85.
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See, e.g., Jason Delisle & Alexander Holt, New Am. Found., Safety Net or Windfall?: Examining
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eleven to twenty, the income-contingent payments and ultimate forgiveness
would still be generous. But if a borrower ends up having a more lucrative
later career, some of that value could be captured through higher payments
in years eleven to twenty. Finally, many people—not just lawyers—may move
between the private and public sector throughout their careers, and it is not
obvious to me that requiring ten years of strict public service work (and/or
the hassle of moving between different repayment programs) creates the right
incentives.
In part, these first two points collapse into one. The measurement both of
a person’s need and of how much a person is sacrificing from his or her own
earnings to contribute to the public good are both captured (albeit imperfectly)
by the person’s income. Attempting to further differentiate requires linedrawing. By its nature, that sort of line-drawing will be imperfect and
introduces massive differences in treatment based on formalistic distinctions.
As of the first quarter of 2018, approximately one-third of all applications for
certification that a job qualified for PSLF had been denied, according to the
Department of Education.90 Even if some of those applications were shots in
the dark, it is likely either that a significant number of borrowers mistakenly
believed that they qualified, or (worse) that the approval process is broken.
Looking only at income provides a fairer and more objective measure than a
bureaucracy (typically at a private loan servicing company) trying to apply a
flawed definition of “public interest.”91
Third, if we cannot differentiate the two based on need and programmatic
goals, we have to look to more subjective notions like merit and desert—one
of these lawyers simply deserves a more generous transfer because of the
meritorious choice to work in the public interest (even if we could define that
well). I think the moral weakness of this position speaks for itself, particularly
because the underlying structure of the student loan program means that
these benefits go disproportionately to those with graduate and professional
degrees, rather than the many others who also work in the public interest.92
Finally, and more practically, the gulf between the treatment of PSLF and
other IDR borrowers opens up the broader IDR program to political attack,93
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and the cost of PSLF limits the ability to expand IDR into other areas. I have
argued elsewhere both for expanding the amount of IDR-eligible debt that
is available to undergraduates94 and for excluding the forgiven debt from
gross income for tax purposes.95 Both would likely have some fiscal cost, and
reforming PSLF is a compelling way to offset those costs. Reform of PSLF
could also allow more targeted benefits to the neediest borrowers in general
IDR, such as by using a graduated repayment rate structure instead of the
current flat 10% rate. While a full consideration of possible reforms to PSLF
and IDR is beyond the scope of this article, unpacking the economic, policy,
and moral arguments undergirding IDR will be a necessary part of that project.
VI. Conclusion
Legal education and legal services are, by their very nature, expensive,
and those high costs pose a deep threat to justice. Our increasingly complex,
regulatory, and legalized world requires the mediation of professionals trained
to navigate complicated legal and regulatory systems, but the high cost of
training and retaining lawyers means that many individuals and households
go without, and the systems intended to ensure broad welfare and shared
prosperity go unattended. The cost disease has a very real effect not just on
economic justice, but on civil and legal justice as well.
Addressing these issues will require multiple solutions, but we should
recognize that we already have in place a tool that could effectively provide
progressive, public funding of legal education—a tool to help cure the cost
disease. Income-driven repayment, by tying student loan payments to income
and forgiving loans after a period of time, helps to ensure that legal education
is affordable to anyone, regardless of her ultimate practice area or even career.
And that, in turn, can mean more lawyers working in the public interest and
serving moderate-income households. Income-contingent loans are not, and
cannot be, the only solution, but any broader reform must consider their
already central role in financing legal education and legal services.
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Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates, 1999-2013
Public school, in-state listed (gross) tuition

8.80%

Private school listed tuition

5.18%

Public school net tuition

7.65%

Private school net tuition

4.14%

PPI for legal services

3.99%

Professor compensation (salary & benefits)*

3.81%

Lawyer salaries (salary & estimate of benefits)

3.6%

HEPI

3.31%

CPI-U

2.47%

* 1997-2011
Sources cited in text
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